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Abstract—With the development of artificial intelligence and 
self-driving, vehicular ad-hoc network  (VANET)  has  become  an 
irreplaceable part of the Intelligent Transportation Systems 
(ITSs). However, the traditional network of the ground cannot 
meet the requirements of transmission, processing, and storage 
among vehicles. Under this circumstance, integrating space and 
air nodes into the whole network can provide comprehensive 
traffic information and reduce the transmission delay. The high 
mobility and low latency in the Space-Air-Ground Integrated 
Network (SAGIN) put forward higher requirements for security 
issues such as identity authentication, privacy protection and data 
security. This paper simplifies the Blockchain and proposes an 
identity authentication and privacy protection scheme based on 
the Hashchain in the SAGIN. The scheme focuses on the 
characteristics of the wireless signal to identify and authenticate 
the nodes. The verification and backup of the records on the block 
are implemented with the distributed streaming platform, Kafka 
algorithm, instead of the consensus. Furthermore, this paper 
analyzes the security of this scheme. Afterward, the experimental 
results reveal the delay brought by the scheme using the simulation 
of SUMO, OMNeT++, and   Veins. 
Index Terms—Space-Aerial-Ground Integrated Network, 
Blockchain, Identity Authentication, Safety 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The explosive growth in population and vehicles has brought 
enormous challenges to the transportation system. With the 
increasing number of vehicles, it is impossible to rely only    on 
the traditional network of the ground. Therefore, Many studies 
have been carried out on the construction of the Space-Air-
Ground Integrated Network (SAGIN) [1] [2]. [1] defines a 
SAGIN architecture, which can support dynamic management 
of resources using a Software Defined Network (SDN) 
controller. In [2], a space-based information system combined 
with the network of the ground is proposed. This system can 
enhance the capabilities of remote sensing, navi- gation and 
communication, and promote the development of real-time 
location services. In addition, many international companies 
are also conducting research and exploration. Tesla plans to 
launch 700 low-cost commercial satellites to provide Internet 
access services. Google’s Loon project aims to use high-
altitude balloons to provide broadband access to remote areas.  
Facebook  is  trying  to  deploy  solar  drones  as   well. 
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Therefore, the SAGIN will become an inevitable trend of future 
development. 
There exist many different nodes in the SAGIN, such as 
vehicle nodes, roadside infrastructure, mobile terminal users, 
drones, airships and other stratospheric nodes, as well as high- 
altitude satellite nodes. Thus, it is obvious that SAGIN is 
confronting multiple challenges. On one hand, [3] presents      a 
summary of the privacy and security challenges of VANET that 
need to be solved for the popularization of autonomous 
vehicles. In [4], the attacks of VANET are classified and 
explained along with their effects, specifically in the SAGIN. It 
is important to point out that the attacks of authenticity, 
identity, confidentiality, data integrity, and privacy must have 
a better solution before a wide application of the SAGIN. 
Another one is the stratospheric and satellite nodes also need to 
protect effectively. Several other papers (e.g., [28-34]) have 
studied related security and wireless issues. In short, problems 
of security in the SAGIN have drawn more and more  attention. 
Recently, with the characteristics of the distribution and data 
protection, the concept of Blockchains has been investigated 
intensively [5] [6]. More and more people apply them  to  other 
types of networks, especially in distributed systems, such as the 
Internet of Things (IoT) [7] [8] [9] [10], medical 
health [11], cloud computing [12], mobile commerce [13] [14], 
and privacy and security in distributed networks [15].  Ali Dorri 
et al. introduced the application of blockchains in IoT smart 
home security in their papers [7] [16] [17] [18]    and related 
research. In [8], the author proposed a system based on 
Blockchains that can detect attacks in real time by low power 
consumption and future scalability of the IoT. In terms of 
identity authentication, privacy protection and data security, 
many scholars have conducted intense research [15] [19]. In 
[19], an out-of-band authentication scheme for IoTs based on 
Blockchain is proposed. The Eris Blockchain and related 
equipment are used to simulate the performance of the entire 
integrated system. 
The high-speed mobility and low latency requirements of the 
SAGIN bring more security problems to the network. On the 
one hand, due to the central management, the traditional 
systems have many security drawbacks. Once the management 
nodes are attacked, the security of the entire network will face 
serious threats. On the other hand, based on the third-party 
security authentication scheme, the border crossing activities 
need the third-party transmission, which would cost more time. 
|| 
In brief, Blockchain is distributed and decentralized. It has a 
good solution to the problems faced by traditional   systems. 
Therefore, Blockchain can be used to enhance the security of 
the SAGIN. In this paper, the key technologies of the 
Blockchain are simplified for the security problems in the SA- 
GIN, and the cross-border identity authentication and privacy 
protection scheme based on the Hashchain is proposed. The 
contributions of this paper are as  follows: 
• we identify and authenticate nodes in the SAGIN by using 
the characteristics of the wireless  signal. 
• we propose a Hashchain that meets the requirements for 
low latency in the  SAGIN. 
• we establish a cross-border identity authentication and 
privacy protection scheme based on  Hashchain. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II 
introduces the proposed system framework and analyzes key 
technologies. Security performance analysis and simulation 
experiments for the proposed framework are discussed in 
Section III. Section IV concludes this paper and presents some 
plans. 
 
II. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK AND KEY TECHNOLOGIES 
This section describes the system model and certification 
scheme in this paper. We contrast Hashchain with the tradi- 
tional structure, and describe the key technologies in   detail. 
 
A. System Model 
In the future, the vehicle can be considered as a super mobile 
terminal, which will be equipped with dozens or even hundreds 
of sensors. In the face of the numerous and com- plicated 
information resources, the vehicle need to exchange 
environmental information with other vehicles, roadside in- 
frastructure, and road control centers through these sensors. 
Meanwhile, the dimensions and scale requirements of the 
situation information become more and more complicated and 
accurate. Since the increasing number of vehicles and the smart 
devices or sensors, it is not enough to simply develop the 
VANET. In the next part, this paper takes cross-border identity 
information transmission as an example, then compares and 
analyzes the traditional structure and the Hashchain-based 
structure of SAGIN. 
1) Traditional Structure: The traditional cross-border han- 
dover authentication structure is divided into three layers, ve- 
hicle nodes, small-area management nodes (usually processed 
by the road side units (RSUs)), and the certificate authorities 
(CA). This framework is a centralized structure and is au- 
thenticated by the third party. There are two typical scenarios 
of cross-border identification information transmission. The 
first scenario is to switch from a security domain(SD) to a 
neighboring SD under the management of the same CA. The 
second scenario is shown in Fig 1(a). Vehicles travel from SD- 
A to SD-B, which are managed by different CAs. Therefore, 
the transmission of vehicle identification information requires 
the authentication of CA-A and CA-B  constantly. 
2) Hashchain-Based Structure of SAGIN: The cross-border 
identity authentication framework of the SAGIN based on 
Hashchain is a decentralized and distributed structure. As 
shown in Fig 1(b), CA is only responsible for the registration 
of vehicle nodes for the first time to join the SAGIN. In the 
Hashchain-Based framework, the management node of SD-A, 
called security manager (SM), adds the cross-border vehicle 
identity information to the blockchain, and the SM of the other 
SD synchronizes the account to obtain the vehicle identity 
information, where the vehicle is going to travel to. In addition, 
information can be transmitted by means of air nodes in the 
SAGIN, reducing the overall delay of the   network. 
B. Certification scheme 
In this section, a cross-border scheme based on Hashchain  is 
proposed. The scheme uses the characteristics of the wire- less 
signal to identify and authenticate nodes, and replaces 
consensus with Kafka, which the verification and backup of 
the records on the block are implemented   by. 
1) Transmission Handshake: Before entering the SAGIN, 
vehicles must be registered by CA. During the registration,  we 
use the system integrated by Universal Software Radio 
Peripheral (USRP) or Agilent 9404 oscilloscope and computer 
to collect the wireless signal feature of the vehicle node as its 
identity fingerprint Rv , and records this identity information. 
Besides, the vehicle node record this as well. The cross domains 
handshake process in the SAGIN is shown in Fig 
2. This algorithm to display the total scheme can be described 
step by step as  follows: 
Step 1: When a vehicle, Vi, joins to the SAGIN for the first 
time, it should send the beacon with an identity authentication 
request to the SM: Rv        beacon. 
SM collects the wireless signal of the vehicle, and obtains its 
characteristic fingerprint, Rv
′ . Comparing the collected Rv
′ and 
Rv sent by the vehicle, SM will realize the legality of this 
vehicle. If it is consistent, the vehicle is determined to be a 
legitimate vehicle. Otherwise, it is an illegal   one. 
Step 2: SMthis picks up  the  border  crossing  activity  of the 
vehicle through beacons messages sent by the legitimate 
vehicle, including speed, direction, and location. These border 
crossing activities are formed into individual transactions. 
Totally, SM will record n transaction within a period. The 
transaction templates are shown in Table   I. 
Step 3: SM packages n transactions into blocks, which are 
linked to the Hashchain based on the Kafka algorithm, and the 
block results return to the SMthis, while other SMs update their 
own local hyperledger at the same time. The format of Block is 
shown in Table  II. 
Step  4: SMdest  decrypts the identity materials according   to 
the private key, which would obtain that who will travel to the 
local area. 
2) Wireless Signal Feature: In the process of research on 
individual identification, many scholars have carried out many 
experiments on the types of features. It is an effective method 
of identity authentication by the physical features [20] [21] 
[22]. This paper takes the  individual identification of    drones 
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Fig. 2.   Transmission Handshake 
the transaction packet. Whats more, we use the public key of 
the destination SM for encryption, so that the other SM cannot 
read these materials. The destination SM uses its private key  to 
decrypt the vehicle identity materials, who is going to this SD. 
In addition, current SM could package all transactions collected 
per unit time into  blocks. 
As shown in Table 2, the format of block consists of the 
identity of the source SM, the Previous Block Hash, the 
Timestamp, and Merkle Tree Root. The second field describes 
the hash of the previous block in the chain that directly links  to 
the parents block. As for the Merkle Tree Root, it is obtained 
through all transaction in the block. Each record of the 
transaction records is hashed, and then combined randomly 
with any transaction to get a new hash value. Finally, all 
transaction are merged into the Merkle Tree Root, which will 
build up the protection of the integrity. Once any transaction is 
changed by someone else, the Merkle Tree Root will change 
consistently. Additionally, the Timestamp remains the creation 
as an example. The [23] extracts the characteristics of the Hash 
fingerprint to the wireless signal, and uses the support vector 
data description (SVDD) algorithm to detect and identify. The 
average recognition rate is about 91.1%. In our framework,  the 
function which represents the Hash fingerprint feature of 
wireless signal has been defined as an array consisting of 1, 
-1, 0, named Rnode. The feature fingerprint of the wireless 
signal is unique and unclonable compared with the traditional 
public-private key scheme. 
3) Hashchain Format: In combination with the character- 
istics of SAGIN transmission, a detailed presentation of the 
Hashchain format is defined, as shown in Table I. Transactions 
are developed to encapsulate identifiable materials from the 
source SM to destination SM. The Transaction Header con- 
tains five fields, the identity materials of source SM, Rthis, the 
transaction number i, the identity of destination SM, Rdest, the 
vehicle identity materials including the encrypted data and the 
timestamp. Source and destination SMs are considered as the 
input and output in the traditional Blockchain system [5]. The 
transaction number relates to the position of this transaction in 
time of this  block. 
4) Kafka:  In the traditional blockchain, such as bitcoin,  it 
may take almost 10 minutes to create a block. It is obvious that 
this delay doesn’t meet the demands of time in the SAGIN. 
Therefore, we simplify the traditional blockchain and 
implement the verification and backup of the records on the 
block with a distributed message processing, Kafka, without 
relying on consensus. 
Apache Kafka [24] is a distributed streaming platform. 
Best of all, Kafka has high throughput  and  low  latency. The 
kafka cluster stores streams of records in categories, called 
topics. For each topic, the kafka cluster maintains a partitioned 
log, which is  an  ordered,  immutable  sequence  of records. 
Specifically, there are two main roles, producers and 
consumers. Producers publish a  stream  of  topics  into  the 
kafka cluster in this way, which can push the data as a batch to 
improve the efficiency. In fact, we can modify the parameters 
of the batch to create a new block. For example, we can set the 
different values of the cumulative quantity, the cumulative time 
interval, or the accumulated data size. Another 
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FORMAT  OF TRANSACTION. 
TABLE II 
FORMAT OF BLOCK. 
 
  
 
role is consumers that can subscribe to one or more topics from 
the kafka cluster. In general, Producers and consumers are 
considered as input and output in the Hashchain system. The 
Hashchain-based authentication algorithm is shown in 
Algorithm 1. 
of the Hashchain are: 1) distributed and 2) decentralized. These 
above statements mean that the Hashchain structure is regarded 
as a Peer-to-Peer(P2P) topology. Concretely, the following is 
an analysis of the security and privacy of the cross-border 
identity authentication scheme based on the Hashchain in   the 
      SAGIN. Table III lists some of the security requirements    and 
  Algorithm 1: Create Block based on   Kafka  
Input: Information to create candidate Block Header H: 
Block Version VB ,Previous Block Hash Hashpre, this 
identity of SM, RSM −this, Timestamp    tnow , 
Transactions Ttran  = [T1, T2 Tn], 
Cumulative quantity, N . 
Output:  the Hashed Block Header  Htemp 
1:   Initialise bool variable IsBlock = FALSE; 
2:  Initialise the sum of transactions in this block   Sum; 
3:   Initialise result = randP erm(Ttrans) 
4:  Remove result from the transaction  pool, 
result ¢ Ttrans; 
5:  for Sum ™ N do 
6: Select randomly Ti = randP erm(Ttrans) and 
Ti = result; 
7: Remove Ti from the transaction pool, Ti ¢ Ttrans; 
8: result = dhash(Ti result); 
9: Sum + +; 
10:  end for 
11:  Calculate Merkle tree root RootM basing on   result 
12:   Creat the hash block heard   Htemp 
Htemp = VB   Hashpre  RootM   tnow   RSM −this 
13:  Start a Zookeeper  server; 
14:  while Not IsBlock  do 
15: Use Kafka connect to import data to the   chain; 
16:  end while 
17: return the Hashed Block Header Htemp and Block 
Number 
 
III. ANALYSIS AND SIMULATION 
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed 
framework in two major aspects. One is the security analysis of 
the entire framework, and the other is the delay simulation and 
analysis of the  framework. 
A. Security Analysis 
This paper takes the security of Hashchain into considera- 
tion when the Hashchain is adopted as the basic framework of 
the whole authentication process. The most important features 
corresponding solutions. 
The framework leverages the effective data security features 
of Hashchain to ensure security in the SAGIN. Specifically, this 
paper analyzes some questions from the following aspects: 
• Confidentiality: The identity materials need to be encrypt- 
ed and transmitted by a hash   function. 
• Integrity: The storage of each action/data is based on the 
Merkle tree. Distinctly, we can easily learn that whether 
the data has been tampered with relying on the Merkle 
Tree Root. It is able to ensure the integrity of the data in 
this way. 
• Non-repudiation: In this network, every SM will have 
timestamp and signature when recording. Besides, the 
other peers will update their local hyperledger, so that     it 
is fairly easy to compare and verify by different  nodes. 
 
B. Network Simulation 
This paper simulates the experiments by SUMO [25], OM- 
NeT++ [26] and Veins [27]. Here, SUMO is used to simulate 
road traffic, OMNeT++ implements network framework sim- 
ulation, and Veins combines these two software to simulate 
complex communication of nodes. We mainly consider the de- 
lay of communication and authentication between the vehicles 
and the low-altitude management  nodes. 
1) Simulation Setup: In this simulation, the nodes com- 
municate with each other based on IEEE 802.11p with the 
parameters  as  Table  IV.  Meantime,  the  simulation scenario 
is shown in Fig 3. The low-altitude drone is used as  the source 
domain management node and the vehicles are gen- erated from 
the four vertex positions of the route respective- ly,  which  
travel  from  SD-A  to  SD-B  along  the  road.  The 
vehicle speed is 8.33m/s(30km/h), 13.89m/s(50km/h), 
19.44m/s(70km/h), 27.78m/s(100m/s), the number of 
ve- hicles increased from 20 to 120, with a step size of 20. 
2) Result: For the identity detection and identification, we 
equip the USRP and other devices to collect the wireless signals  
sent  by  the  nodes  in  real  time  and  then  use     the 
trained model to classify the signals. The experimental results 
indicate that the whole process takes about 11ms on  average. 
Transition Header 
Identity materials of source SM, Rthis 
Number of this transaction 
Identity materials of destination SM,   Rdest 
Vehicle identity materials including the encrypted data. 
(pseudonym V 
′ 
|| vehicle identity, Rv )PKSMdest 
Timestamp 
 
Block Header 
Identity materials of the source SM,    Rthis 
Previous Block Hash 
Timestamp 
Merkle Tree Root 
Payload(Transaction) 
Transaction N0.1, · · · , Transaction No.n 
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TABLE III 
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND SOLUTIONS IN THE SPACE-AIR-GROUND INTEGRATED    NETWORKS 
 
Security Requirements Solutions 
 
Nodes authentication 
We  can  use  the  characteristics  of  the  wireless 
signal to identify and authenticate nodes because 
of its uniqueness and  unclonability. 
 
Various attacks (Sybil attacks, Denial of Service 
attacks, Replay attacks, etc.) 
Once  a  node  launches  an  attack  in  the  entire 
network, it will be discovered and eliminated by 
other nodes. 
A node is broken, and the data record about the 
node is backed up  elsewhere. 
Data security 
Due to the Merkle Tree Root, the record in the 
Hashchain is tamper-resistant and  undeniable. 
Efficiency and low latency 
Simplifying the Blockchain, we replace   consen- 
sus with Kafka 
Privacy protection 
we   put   forward   the   method   based   on    the 
pseudonym 
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TABLE IV 
SIMULATION SETUP 
 
Fig. 4. The comparison between Hashchain and non-Hashchain  structure about 
delay 
 
 
The dotted line indicates the time cost of Hashchain-based 
authentication in the SAGIN, and  the  solid  line  illustrates the 
delay overhead without Hashchian. Also, different colors 
represent the results of different vehicle speeds. At the same 
speed, with the increment of vehicles,  the  average  end-to- end 
delay increases consistently. It is obvious that the average delay 
required for the authentication scheme of this paper is 
larger than the one without Hashchain. Taking the vehicle 
speed of 30km/h as an example, the authentication delay 
without Hashchain is 5.9ms, and the authentication process 
delay with the Hashchain is 7.36ms. In the case where the 
vehicle speed is 50km/h, the gap of delay between the two 
In practice, a pre-trained model is used for detection and 
classification, so the delay is greatly  reduced. 
Additionally, in order to compare the changes about delays 
between Hashchain structure and without Hashchain, we de- 
sign this simulation model. The results are shown in Fig 4. 
schemes is smaller, because that the speed of the vehicle 
matches the number of transactions. That means the delay of 
the entire network waiting for the transaction to form a   block 
is shorter. From the overall situation, the average latency of 
authentication based on Hashchain is 8.6ms, which is  greatly 
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Parameters Values 
Frequency/(ttHz) 5.89 
IEEE 802.11p data rate/(Mbps) 6 
sensitivity in physical layer/(dBm) -89 
Number of SM 2 
Total area/(km2) 
Simulation time/(s) 
1 × 1 
360 
Vehicular density (20-120) 
Vehicle speed/(km/h) 30,50,70,100 
beacon size without Hashchain/(bit) 80 
Hashchain-Based beacon size/(bit) 720 
 
reduced compared to the traditional blockchain generation 
time. On the other hand, further research is needed to achieve 
lower latency requirements. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This paper proposes a robust Hashchain-based authenti- 
cation scheme, which manages the data information in the 
network through the effective data security features of the 
Hashchain.  At  the  same  time,  this  paper  illustrates    secu- 
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